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Abstract 
The morning congestion problem has been an important society issue. It is necessary to alleviate traffic congestion on rush hours. 
Dynamic tolls have been proposed to solve the congestion problem on a road with bottleneck. Compared fine toll and uniform 
toll, a coarse toll is easier to implement and operate in rush hours. In this paper, a congestion problem between a residential area 
and the CBD has been considered. There have two transport modes including automobile and railroad. Automobile users have to 
suffer the queue when the road has a bottleneck. Some commuters prefer to travel by railroad because of its convenience and 
lower cost. It users do not have to pay the schedule delay cost. However, congestion pricing is a negative incentive and travellers’ 
public acceptability of such a measure is typically low. Giving positive incentives is likely to have little resistance, while similar 
results may be expected. Reward can be regarded as a potential of positive financial incentives to solve traffic congestion. We 
mainly talk about two different policies on road and railroad. Coarse toll has been levied on the road with bottleneck. A reward 
has been implemented on the railroad. The reward comes from the coarse toll revenue which has been levied on the road, and it is 
allocated towards the commuters who travel by railroad. Two types of railroad fare have been considered: when it is set equal  to 
the marginal cost and when it is set equal to average cost. These models allow us to show that toll policy to be more efficient as 
long as toll revenue is directed towards public transport when the railroad fare is equal to average cost. 
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1. Introduction 
In recently years, traffic congestion has become one of the most important society issues. How to alleviate traffic 
congestion has been an important question to the transportation scholars. Increasing road capacity and reducing 
traffic demand are the two ways to alleviate this phenomenon. According to Adams laws ‘you cannot pave your way 
out of traffic congestion’, providing more road space has been proven to be self-defeating in congested areas, 
because the increased capacity will soon be absorbed by induced travel demand. Therefore, taking the congestion 
pricing as a transportation demand management has become a very important significance in theory and practice. 
Congestion pricing has received far more attention than quantity control in both theory and practice. The 
influential work is done by Pigou (1920) who suggests that vehicles using congested roads should bear a tax equal to 
the difference between marginal social cost and marginal private cost. Subsequently, this model has been extended 
by many others (Arnott et al., 1993; Tao et al., 2012). For reasons of equity, accessibility and liberty, congestion 
pricing has a negative connotation for the majority of drivers as shown by studies conducted in various cities. There 
exist many researches to study congestion toll revenue in the literature. Litman (2005) argues that toll revenues 
should benefit society as whole and not only motorists. If toll revenues are automatically allocated towards road 
restoration and new road construction, or used to reduce motorists’ fees, these measures risk causing an increase in 
automotive use due to increased supply in road infrastructure, thus worsening existing congestion. 
Different from the static congestion pricing, some authors propose dynamic tolls for the bottleneck model to 
describe the congestion behaviour of morning commute (Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al., 1993). In these analyses, 
commuters must choose their departure times to minimize the sum of travel delays and schedule costs. There exist 
three tolls on the bottleneck model: the fine toll, uniform toll and the coarse toll.  
The Nobel laureate Vickrey (1969) proposes a fine toll model to describe the bottleneck model. After that, this 
model has been extended by many others (Lindsey et al., 2004; Gonzales et al., 2012). It is well known that if the 
toll rate charged at the bottleneck can be changed continuously, an optimal toll scheme can be found to eliminate the 
queuing delay in the system. Under an optimal toll, each commuter pays the amount of toll equal to the queuing 
delay cost at the no-toll equilibrium. As a result, the queuing delay is totally eliminated, and the arrival time is 
evenly distributed throughout the morning rush hours. However, a fine toll cannot be implemented in real life, 
because of its confusion which is caused by frequently changing toll rate.  
A uniform toll is constant throughout the peak, and causes no change in the departure rate in the bottleneck 
model. It can only limit congestion cost by reducing demand (Vincent, 2012). The optimal uniform toll equals the 
marginal external cost when the queue is not eliminated (Arnott et al., 1993). A uniform toll hence raises the price, 
and lowers the number of users and consumer surplus. Accordingly, this scheme is comparable to tolling in the 
textbook static-congestion model, which may cause inequity and be perceived as another flat tax. In this way, 
uniform toll often receives the public’s resistance.  
Unlike the two former tolls, a coarse toll is easier to implement and operate in rush hours. It is between uniform 
and fine toll: it somewhat changes the departure pattern, but also raises the price. This makes it important to control 
for price sensitivity of demand when considering a coarse toll (Vincent, 2012). At equilibrium, the arriving pattern 
under a coarse toll scheme is much more difficult to derive than a fine toll, because of the changes in trip costs at the 
beginning and ending time of the tolling period. The equilibrium under a coarse toll is first studied by Arnott et al. 
(1990).They obtain a stable traffic equilibrium pattern based on the expected utility hypothesis. The problem is 
revisited by Laih (1994), who provides a convenient way to calculate the optimal flat toll without discussing the 
explicit evolution of the queue. The result is based on the assumption that drivers who choose to pass the bottleneck 
after a certain tolling period can wait on a set of secondary lanes without impeding other drivers who do pass the 
bottleneck in that tolling period. For simply, we refer to their models and treatments as the ‘ADL model’ and the 
‘Laih model’ respectively.  
However, there usually exist two or more transport modes in reality. Some commuters prefer to travel by mass 
transit because of its convenience and lower cost (Buehler, 2001). Those papers (Tabuchi, 1993; Danielis, 2011) 
usually concentrate on fine toll and uniform toll. In this paper, coarse tolls have been considered on a road when 
there has mass transit as a transit mode, and they have been analysed to affect the distribution of travel demand 
between two modes. Implementing coarse tolls would be considered to avoid confusion by the frequently change 
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toll rate and not a tax in a whole day. We compare the effect of two coarse tolls when transit fare equals to marginal 
cost and average cost, and we analyse the impact of two coarse tolls on total cost and on modal split.  
Congestion pricing, however, is a negative incentive and travellers’ public acceptability of such a measure is 
typically low. Giving positive incentives is likely to have little resistance, while similar results may be expected. 
Reward can be regarded as a potential of positive financial incentives to solve traffic congestion. The true mainly 
difference with earlier studies of coarse tolls is our focus on rewards. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the 
possibilities of rewards so as to encourage modal transfer in order to reduce externalities due to automobile use. The 
reward can be effective tools in changing commuting behaviour, reduce the shares of rush-hour driving. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the basic bottleneck model and a railroad with scale 
economies. Section 3 derives the modal equilibrium and total costs when the railroad fare is set equal to average cost, 
which the results are compared. Section 4 derives the modal equilibrium and total costs when the railroad fare is set 
equal to marginal cost. In section 5, numerical examples are conducted to demonstrate the effect of the four reward 
regimes. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Basic bottleneck model and modal split  
In this paper, a major commuting corridor connecting the residents to the CBD with a highway and a railroad line 
is considered. Automobiles are used on the road with a bottleneck while a commuter train in utilized on the railroad. 
The numbers of respective users are denoted by aN  and bN . We firstly analyse the road with a bottleneck as the 
beginning point of our analysis,  
In the bottleneck congestion model, developed by ADL (1990), following by the Vickrey (1969), the automobile 
commuters would incur a travel cost consisting of two components: the travel time costs and the schedule delay 
costs. The total average cost would be expressed (see ADL, 1990):  
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We consider the railroad as the alternative commuting mode (Tabuchi, 1993). Assuming the total cost per 
railroad (the average cost) commuter is given by   
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The public authority in this city sets a railroad fare p. Since the travel time by railroad is ignored, and then p 
becomes the total private cost for each railroad commuter. Finally, we decide the total social cost 
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3.  Average cost pricing and coarse toll 
Coming from a more realistic point of view, authorities can make the decision to institute coarse tolls, which 
would add constant costs to each trip and would not alter travel timetables. As in the case of a coarse toll, the 
commuter is assumed to have incurred the same travel cost no matter what time he leaves home. Firstly, we talk 
about the equilibrium with a coarse toll in the ADL model and the railroad fare which equals to average cost as the 
beginning of this section.  
3.1. Average cost pricing and redistribution of a coarse toll in the ADL model 
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A coarse toll in the ADL model can be described as follows. Commuters who pay the toll arrive 
between t  and t  . After the toll, the rest of the commuters suddenly arrive at the bottleneck in the point t  . The 
total average cost of auto commuting is same at the peak hour when reach the equilibrium (ADL, 1990). We can get  
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The reward of the coarse toll in the ADL model is be considered in the following. The objective is to integrate a 
reward of toll revenue and to evaluate the effects on the modal split and on the total cost incurred by drivers and 
railroad users. Toll revenue can be rewarded to subsidize the individual use of railroad and to reduce the cost 
incurred by passengers. By use of the results obtained in the ADL (1990), we get the coarse toll in the ADL model, 
the beginning time t  and the ending time t  of the coarse toll 
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So, revenue generated by the toll is 
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where the subscript A represents ADL model. 
Toll revenue can be rewarded to subsidize the individual use of railroad and to reduce the cost incurred by 
passengers. City authorities fix the railroad ticket price ( /b A bp c R N  ) that every commuter have to pay for the 
travel. T. At equilibrium, the travel costs of driving and the railroad price are the same. We have 
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The solution of the above equations can be the number of motorists and the number of railroad commuters: 
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3.2. Average cost pricing and redistribution of a coarse toll in the Laih model 
Laih (1994) considers a coarse toll, under the assumption that tolling does not affect the timing of arrivals. 
Commuters who pay the toll arrive between t  and t  . By use of the results obtained in the Laih (1994), we get the 
coarse toll in the Laih model, the beginning time t  and the ending time t  of the coarse toll 
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Revenue generated by the toll is˖ 
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Like the former model, city authorities fix the railroad ticket price ( /b A bp c R N  ) that every commuter have 
to pay for the travel. At equilibrium, the travel costs of driving and taking railroad are the same, we have 
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The solution of the above equations can be the number of automobile commuters and the number of railroad 
commuters: 
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where 2 22 ( 12 3 ) /N N cs sF c sG G!     can ensure both the railroad and the automobile would be use.  
The total social cost is expressed by: 
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4. Marginal cost pricing and coarse tolls 
In Section3, the railroad fare which is set equal to average cost has been considered. In this section, the setting of 
railroad fare at marginal cost has been considered. Firstly, we talk about the equilibrium with a coarse toll in the 
ADL model and the railroad fare which equals to average cost as the beginning of this section.  
4.1. Marginal cost pricing and redistribution of a coarse toll in the ADL model 
The reward of the coarse toll in the ADL model is be considered when the ticket fare is equal to marginal cost in 
the following. The objective is to integrate a reward of toll revenue and to evaluate the effects on the modal split and 
on the total cost incurred by drivers and railroad users. Toll revenue can be rewarded to subsidize the individual use 
of railroad and to reduce the cost incurred by passengers. 
 
( )A AR s t tU                                                                               (8) 
 
where the subscript A represents ADL model. 
Toll revenue can be rewarded to subsidize the individual use of railroad and to reduce the cost incurred by 
passengers. City authorities fix the railroad ticket price /A bp c R N  that every commuter has to pay for the travel. 
At equilibrium, the model split would be expressed as: 
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It is straightforward that under the marginal cost pricing system, the equilibrium numbers of respective users are 
given by 
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We calculate the individual travel cost at equilibrium after the redistribution of toll revenue: 
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The total social cost is expressed by: 
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4.2. Marginal cost pricing and redistribution of a coarse toll in the Laih model 
The reward of the coarse toll in the Laih model is to now integrate a reward of toll revenue and to evaluate the 
effects on the modal split and on the total cost incurred by drivers and railroad users. According to the previous, 
revenue generated by the toll is˖ 
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Toll revenue can be rewarded to subsidize the individual use of public transport and to reduce the cost incurred 
by passengers. City authorities fix the railroad ticket price ( /A bp c R N  ) that every commuter have to pay for the 
travel. At equilibrium, the travel costs of driving and taking railroad are the same, we have 
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The solution of the above equations can be the number of automobile commuters and the number of railroad 
commuters: 
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We calculate the individual travel cost at equilibrium after the redistribution of toll revenue: 
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The total social cost is expressed by: 
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5. Numerical results 
The numerical simulations would be presented to evaluate the ranking of the tolling regimes. The values of 
parameters are used to in Danielis (2011). AssumeD =5$/h, E =3.05$/h, J =11.88$/h, N= 24100, s= 8100vehicles/h, 
c= 2.84$, and F=9000$. We can now compare the results of the models. Applying these values to the equations of 
the model, the results of tolls model are presented in Table 1when fares are set equal to average cost. 
We firstly analyze the effect of the redistribution of two coarse tolls. Both of them reduce the total social cost. In 
the redistribution of the ADL model, the number of motorists is decreased 11.7%. In the Laih model, the number of 
motorists is decreased 18.6%. This means after the reward of the coarse toll, commuters are more like to travel by 
railroad than by automobile. If we take the total toll revenue towards to the railroad commuters, we have an efficient 
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policy to alleviate the traffic congestion. Compared to maximum queuing time of no toll model, all the waiting times 
are reduced in these models. But the difference is not large after the redistribution in ADL model and in Laih model. 
The difference time is only 0.02h. From this perspective, there is only a little between the two models. From Table 1, 
comparing all factors in these models, we find that all policies are useful, and the coarse toll in Laih model is more 
useful than the coarse toll in ADL model. This means that building the secondary lanes or shoulders is an effective 
policy to alleviate the traffic congestion.  
 
Table 1. the results when fares are set equal to marginal cost 
 No toll The reward of coarse toll (ADL) The reward of coarse toll (Laih) 
aN  11951 10318 9725 
bN  12149 13782 14378 
TC  86297 71404 71025 
Toll level 0 1.55 1.46 
rush hour 1.48 1.27 1.20 
Maximum queuing time 0.72 0.31 0.29 
 
When the railroad fare is set equal to marginal cost, the results of tolls model are presented in Table 2 when 
railroad fares are set equal to marginal cost. This result is similar to the result when the railroad fares are set equal to 
marginal cost. 
 
Table 2. the results when fares are set equal to marginal cost 
 No toll The reward of coarse toll (ADL) The reward of coarse toll (Laih) 
aN  9478 8708 8366 
bN  14622 15392 15734 
TC  77444 69298 69214 
Toll level 0 1.30 1.25 
rush hour 1.17 1.08 1.03 
Maximum queuing time 0.57 0.26 0.25 
6. Conclusions 
This paper is considered the bottleneck model containing two roads, one of which has the bottleneck, another has 
a competitive railroad. A coarse toll is levied on the road with bottleneck. Compared the two railroad fare regimes 
(those of average cost and marginal cost) after revenue redistribution, it is evident that the modal split favours public 
transport with marginal cost more than with average cost. This is explained by the fact that the ticket fare does not 
take the fixed cost into account. Thus, the total cost is higher with average cost than with marginal cost. However, 
we suppose the departure time of taking railroad could be punctual. In fact, for the limited capacity, it is impossible 
to ensure that everyone could arrive on time. In the future research, we can take this aspect into consideration firstly, 
and then the way to travel and the choice of departure time should also be involved. 
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